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Are Female Top Managers Really Paid Less? 
 
 
 “There is evidence that even when women do reach the highest levels of corporate management, 
they do not receive the same pay as men for the same job; a figure of 75% is often quoted. And 
rather than getting better over time, the position seems to be deteriorating.” (Economist: “The 
glass ceiling”, 24/08/2011) 
 ‘But the biggest obstacle (at least in most rich countries) is children. However organized 
you are, it is hard to combine family responsibilities with the ultra-long working hours and the 
“anytime, anywhere” culture of senior corporate jobs.’ (The Economist, 27th October, 2012) 
 
1 Introduction 
Female participation in the British labor market has been promoted for a long time and with 
remarkable success: 70.5% of women aged 15 to 64 years participate in the labor market (OECD 
Labour Force Statistics, 2010). Still, Eurostat (2011) reports an unadjusted gender pay gap in the 
UK of about 20% – in other words, female employees earn on average 20% less than male 
employees. The relative differences in remuneration even seem to be deteriorating: the global 
gender gap index released by the World Economic Forum in 2013 shows that the UK is only 
ranked number 18 out of 134 countries – down from the 9th position in 2006.  
 A recent report issued by the Chartered Management Institute (CMI, 2011) states that 
although gender wage equality has been achieved for junior executives, this is not the case for 
female managers in top corporate jobs. The literature advances several explanations for the gender 
wage gap. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) propose that ‘sticky floors’ are responsible: 
promotion rates for both women and men are equally fair, but women remain stuck at the lower 
end of the wage distribution due to a lack of convincing outside offers. Furthermore, there may be 
a ‘glass ceiling’ effect, i.e. the estimated gender wage gap increases the closer to the top of the pay 
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distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2005). Matsa and Miller (2011) propound ‘networking-effects’ 
as a possible cause, arguing that the proportion of females in top management is positively related 
to the percentage of female directors on the board (which is low). Other papers concentrate on the 
structure of remuneration contracts: Kulich et al. (2011) argue that the gender pay gap is driven by 
the fact that men have much stronger upward remuneration potential whereas women are offered 
contracts that are less performance sensitive and more suited for risk averse managers. Still, Joshi, 
Makepeace, and Dolton (2010), who focus on the differences in the gender pay gap by age group, 
state that women’s better education starts to close the gap. 
Our raw data in Figure 1 indicate that there is still a significant remuneration gap between 
male and female top managers (the executive directors) in the UK over our sample period (with 
exception of 2003): total compensation has risen substantially for both male and female 
executives over this period, and the size of the gender pay gap varies over time. The average base 
salary as well as the bonus of male executives has consistently been larger than that of female 
executives (Figure 2 and 3). Moreover, the mean level of incentive compensation awarded to male 
executives is significantly higher with exception of one single year (Figure 4).  
[Insert Figures 1-4 about here] 
 
While some papers provide explanations for the gender pay gap of top executives, 
methodological sound measurement of the (evolution of the) pay gap is scarce as the number of 
women who actually make it to the very corporate top is still rather modest. Past analyses often 
compare the average or median size of the pay of male and female executives and draw 
conclusions on the potential causes of gender-based discrimination at the top-corporate level. 
These studies are often flawed when they do not control for (i) individual characteristics such as 
position (CFO, CEO, executive chairman, etc.), tenure in that position, age; (ii) firm 
characteristics such as firm size and riskiness, firm leverage, growth and free cash flows, firm 
performance, internal governance structures comprising board size, board structure and 
independence, presence of female non-executive directors, and the use of board committees; (iii) 
contract composition (pay-for-performance sensitivity); (iv) ownership, in particular its 
 
 3
concentration and nature (type of major owners); and (v) the impact of remuneration consultants. 
In this light, one ought to be very careful in interpreting the above data presented in Figures 1-4 as 
evidence of the gender pay gap. Can we conclude from these numbers that female executive 
directors are discriminated? Not really, as comparing the average salary of males and females 
does not do justice to the impact of the individual situation of these managers such as the 
executive’s position, her age and tenure in the job/corporation, education, track record, and the 
size and industry of her firm. 
Moore (2004: 208) writes that “Family responsibilities fall disproportionately on the 
women in top leadership positions. Marriage and parenthood impinge on women’s careers to a 
far larger extent than they do on similarly situated men’s.” For this reason, we also study whether 
(the number of) children and marital status affects the pay gap. Bertrand, Golding and Katz (2010) 
examine the earnings of business school students after graduation and observe that the earnings of 
males and females diverge quickly – a result that the authors attribute to parenthood decisions. 
Interestingly, Angelov, Johansson, and Lindahl (2013) find that 15 years after entering 
parenthood, the male-female wage gap increases by 35 percentage points compared to its pre-
child level. It should be noted that our study is not on the direct relation between parenthood and 
remuneration as we study this relation for those managers who had a successful career and made it 
to the top of the corporate ladder (they are members of the board of directors of listed companies). 
In other words, we study the gender pay gap for the ‘survivors’, most of whom have been able to 
combine parenthood with a successful career.   
In this paper, we dispose of a particularly rich dataset covering both remuneration and 
career information of male and female top executives of virtually all companies listed in the UK 
over a pre-crisis sample (the period 1996 to 2007). We employ treatment effect estimations on our 
gamut of remuneration measures, which enables us to account for most of the unobserved 
heterogeneity from which many previous studies seem to suffer. After accounting for the most 
important observable characteristics at the manager, firm, and industry level, we compare the pay 
outcome of female and male directors supposing gender-based treatment (‘discrimination’).  
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We report the following findings. First, although our raw data report that the gender-based 
pay gap exists for CEOs and other top executives, our treatment effect analysis unveils little 
evidence of pay discrimination at the CEO level after controlling for firm size, industry, age, 
position, tenure and nearest-neighbor matching without replacement. The lack of a significant pay 
gap is confirmed by further analyses which in addition to the above variables further control for 
ownership concentration, internal corporate governance mechanisms, and performance and firm 
characteristics. Whereas there is no pay gap at the level of the figure-head of the firm – the CEO, 
there is strong pay discrimination at the level of the other top managers (the executive directors 
which include a.o. the deputy CEO, CFO etc.). These female executive directors earn on a yearly 
basis on average about £270k less than male directors in the same position, with similar tenure, in 
the same industry etc. The pay gap is visible at all components of pay: salary, bonus, and equity-
based compensation. Second, whereas the remuneration of neither male nor female executives is 
performance-sensitive, that of CEOs is strongly performance-sensitive. The contracts of female 
CEOs are even more strongly related to both accounting and market-based performance than those 
of male CEOs. Third, we find that the pay-gap is lower for female executive directors when the 
firm has one or more female non-executive directors on the board. In such firms, female CEOs 
earn even more than their male colleagues with similar traits. Fourth, a female executive director 
employed in an industry with a high proportion of male managers receives an average total 
remuneration which is lower than that of male executives, but the gender pay gap is considerably 
smaller in ‘male’ industries such as financial services or ICT. In these industries, female CEOs 
even receive a higher total compensation than comparable male CEOs. Fifth, when the advice of a 
top-3 remuneration consultant is sought, the pay gap is small for CEOs but this is not the case for 
the other executive directors on the board. Finally, we study the impact of marital status and 
parenthood on the pay gap. Married female executive directors with children receive a higher 
remuneration than single female managers. Still, from a careful matching analysis, we learn that 
the pay gap between male and female executive directors widens when we account for parenthood 
and marriage, as married female executive directors with children earn much less than male 
executives with children (and single male managers).   
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The paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the empirical evidence on the 
determinants of the gender wage gap. Section 3 expands on the regulation and lists the 
hypotheses, which are tested with methodologies laid out in Section 4. The results are presented in 
Section 5 and further discussed in Section 6. 
 
2 The Empirical Evidence 
The literature on gender-based discrimination comprises many explanations: glass ceilings, sticky 
floors, occupational and industrial segregation, tournament theory, and the glass cliff. In this 
section, we also touch upon behavioral biases such as the ‘romance of leadership’ theory and 
stereotyping.  
2.1 Glass Ceilings and Sticky Floors 
Some studies relate the gender pay gap to promotion rates. For instance, Booth et al. (2003) state 
that the ‘return-to-promotion’ is higher for men: men’s salaries are more frequently raised as a 
consequence of the fact that male managers more frequently seek and hence receive outside 
offers, and are more inclined to switch companies which increases the likelihood that such offers 
are credible. Accordingly, the fact that women do not receive as many pay rises is the 
fundamental idea behind the ‘sticky-floors’-concept and the notion of higher opportunity cost for 
women. Smith, Smith, and Verner (2013) and Matsa and Miller (2011) argue that female 
managers are discriminated by male-dominated boards. They show that the hiring probabilities 
and promotion chances of women increase with the number of female (executive and non-
executive) directors on the board. 
2.2 Occupational and Industrial Segregation 
Jones and Makepeace (1996) argue that career success is predominantly related to work 
experience as there are few differences in pay for men and women with the same corporate rank, 
but considerable differences stemming from the allocation of men and women across ranks. Kidd 
and Goninon (2000) do not agree and demonstrate that there is a strong industry-effect in that both 
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male and female managers earn less for the same work in female-dominated industries than their 
counterparts in male-dominated industries. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) agree that about 80% of 
the observed differences in remuneration can be attributed to occupational segregation 
(controlling for size, age, and tenure). Allen and Sander (2002) discuss the idea of ‘comparable 
worth’: work predominantly done by women is valued less and is consequently rewarded less. The 
authors argue that women seem to accept this situation as they are less focused on their careers. 
Alkadry and Tower (2007: 889) confirm that “gender typing and socialization tend to result in the 
segregation of women in certain agencies, occupations, and positions.” Thus, a considerable part 
of the differences in pay between male and female executives may be driven by the self-selection 
of women into certain occupations and industries. 
2.3 Corporate Performance and the Glass Cliff 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) state that differences in pay result from different attitudes 
concerning intra-firm competition: men opt twice as much to engage in corporate tournaments 
than women. Whereas women seem to shy away from competition, men tend to embrace it, 
possibly due to overconfidence. In line with these results, Kulich et al. (2011) document that male 
managers’ compensation packages are more performance-dependent than those of female 
managers. The stereotype that women are more risk averse than men may explain why women’s 
pay is less performance-sensitive. A provocative idea is advanced by Ryan and Haslam (2005) in 
that female CEOs are appointed when the firm is experiencing poor performance or financial 
distress. Female CEOs are thus more likely to find themselves in an unenviable and possibly 
threatening situation after their appointment – the ‘glass cliff‘. Indeed, for the UK, Haslam, Ryan, 
Kulich, Trojanowski and Atkins (2009) fail to reject the ‘glass cliff’ hypothesis. Adams, Gupta 
and Leeth (2009) test the ‘glass cliff’ hypothesis for the US, but do not find support: female 
(male) managers are appointed as CEOs at times with relatively better (worse) financial health.  
2.4 Behavioral Biases: Stereotyping and the Romance of Leadership View  
 As company performance is directly attributed to the leader (Meindl, Ehrlich, and 
Dukerich, 1985), why do we observe so few women in a leadership position? In their meta-
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analysis, Eagly et al. (1992) write that female leaders are typically more negatively perceived than 
male leaders. Schein (2001) explains that leadership is typically associated with masculine traits, 
such as competence and the ability to influence. Consequently, female leaders face prejudices 
concerning their supposedly lower ability to lead (Eagly and Karau, 2002). In sum, it might be due 
to this ‘romance of leadership’ that the shareholders’ reaction to the announcement of the 
appointment of a female CEO is significantly more negative than that of a male CEO (Lee and 
James, 2007). This ‘romance of leadership’ bias affects the allocation of pay: Kulich, Ryan, and 
Haslam (2007) show that CEO pay is strongly performance-dependent for male executives, but 
not so for female managers. Moreover, the allocation of a bonus to a female leader is not solely 
based on company performance, as it would be in the case of a male leader, but also on 
perceptions of charisma and leadership ability.  
 Are there any reasons to believe that there are differences in terms of performance, values, 
or risk attitudes between male and female leaders? Eagly et al. (1995) argue that in aggregate, 
male and female leaders were no more or less effective, although they acknowledge gender 
differences regarding (i) the definition of the leadership role in male or female terms, (ii) the type 
of organization, and (iii) the level of leadership. In brief, the authors argue that female executives 
are only then more effective when the leadership roles are defined in less masculine terms (which 
may be the case for example in educational organizations), but will do less well compared with 
men, otherwise. Recent results substantiate gender differences in firm performance: Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) provide evidence that a higher ratio of women on the board weakens firm 
performance – possibly due to overmonitoring. This could be attributed, according to Adams and 
Funk (2011), to the idea that male directors care more about achievement and power than female 
directors, even though female directors are less security- and tradition-oriented than is generally 
assumed. 
In sum, both corporate performance and leadership seem to be more associated with 
masculine traits, while female leaders are often interpreted as not being congruent with their 
gender role. The concept called the ‘romance of leadership’ suggests that pay-for-performance of 
male leaders typically exceeds that of female leaders.  
 
 8
2.5 Children, Marital Status, Careers and Compensation 
Does parenthood affect remuneration? Budig and England (2001) find that the impact of 
parenthood depends on the number of children: each additional child is associated with a 2-7% 
reduction in women’s wages, but the impact of the first child is usually more limited with a 
reduction of 2.1% (Loughran and Zissimopolus, 2009). Bertrand et al. (2010) agree as they 
observe that the impact of the first child tends to be modest and temporary for female MBA 
graduates with lower-earning spouses. Highly skilled women also postpone childbearing to reduce 
its impact on career and compensation (Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood, 2010).1 
Lundberg and Rose (2000) state that it is not just parenthood that influences compensation, 
they find that parents and non-parents differ even before the first birth as both men and women 
with children earned about 9% less before the birth of the first child. Importantly, some studies 
find no relation between managerial compensation and children (Loughran and Zissimopolous, 
2009, Wilde et al., 2010) or even a positive effect (for men) (Lundberg and Rose, 2000). 
In general, there are various reasons as to why marriage should have a positive effect on 
the male’s labor market outcome: Cohen and Haberfeld (1991) point to effects provided by the 
spouse (such as improved household decision making, emotional support, job-related motivation 
and advice), as well as to the changed perception of the husband (greater stability and 
responsibility). Other studies invert the causality: successful men (with higher remuneration) are 
able to find a better (more educated) marriage partner (Cohen and Haberfeld, 1991; Loughran and 
Zissimopoulos, 2009). As far as we know, there are no studies examining the role of a male 
spouse on career success of female managers.  
 
                                                 
1 Likewise, Wood et al. (1993) argue that women in anticipation of childcare acquire less job-related human capital 
than men. Lundberg and Rose (2000) state it is not childbearing that reduces productivity, but lower-productivity 
women selecting themselves into childbearing. 
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3 Wage Equality Regulations and Hypotheses 
The foundation of ‘equal pay for equal work’ in the UK was established in article 119 of 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In 1970, the UK introduced the Equal Pay Act to prevent 
discrimination, which was followed by the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) to promote equal 
opportunities for both sexes. Maternity rights (of at least 26 weeks) were enshrined in the 
Employment Rights Act of 1996. The Kingsmill report (2001) on women’s employment and pay 
summarizes the factors contributing to the gender wage gap as does the ‘Just Pay’ report issued by 
the Equal Pay Task Force in 2001: (i) discrimination in pay, (ii) occupational segregation, and (iii) 
the unequal impact of family responsibilities. The Employment Equality Regulations (2005) 
forbids discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy or maternal leave, and issues rules on (sexual) 
harassment. According to the Women and Work Commission (2006), women seem to be pushed 
into low-paying occupations and do not make full use of their skills. The Commission estimates 
that removing the barriers to women working in occupations traditionally taken by men and 
increasing women’s participation in the labor market, could increase GDP by about 1.3 to 2.0%.  
As the gender-related income inequalities may extend to the top management, we 
hypothesize that female executive directors are paid on average less than men (H1a), and that the 
gender pay gap is higher in industries with a high concentration of male managers (H1b). 
Men opt twice as frequently to engage in a corporate tournament than women – a tendency 
that is largely attributed to overconfidence on the part of men (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). As 
a possible consequence, managerial compensation of male executives is more performance-
sensitive than that of their female peers (Kulich et al., 2011). This study provides evidence that the 
allocation of a bonus to a female leader is not solely based on company performance, as it would 
be in the case of a male leader, but also on perceptions of charisma and leadership skills. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that the composition of the compensation contracts of male 
executive directors is more incentives-based (higher bonus and more equity-based pay) than that 
of female executives (H2a), and that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is lower for female 
managers than for male managers (H2b). 
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The percentage of female executive directors on the board is related to the number of 
women working in corporate top-jobs, possibly due to ‘networking-effects’ (Matsa and Miller, 
2011). Likewise, Smith et al. (2013) observe that the hiring probabilities of women increase with 
a higher number of female directors on the board. While Selody (2011) suggests that boards may 
have biased beliefs about the competence of women, an increased number of women on the board 
may help to correct this view. Hence, we hypothesize that companies with a higher percentage of 
female directors on the board will pay female executives more than firms without female board 
members (H3). It should be noted that this hypothesis is not formulated in terms of a causal 
relation between female (non-)executive directors and pay whereby those female directors are 
augmenting the pay for their female colleagues as it may be that it is simply part of the corporate 
culture to care about equal pay. 
With gender-discrimination moving more and more into the public eye, remuneration 
contract design by remuneration consultants is expected to reduce the gender-based pay gap. 
Indeed, negative publicity induced by gender pay discrimination may tarnish consultants’ 
reputation (Thomas, 2004). This may particularly hold true for the largest pay consultants that are 
subject to intense competition and the immediate threat of losing market share (Kabir and Minhat, 
2011; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Consequently, we hypothesize that hiring top remuneration 
consultants contributes to a reduction of the pay gap (H4). 
Governance may also affect executive pay (Wade et al., 1997): a larger board and a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors may, due to the increased variety of opinions, contribute to 
more balanced decision-making and therefore offset some of the behavioral biases discussed 
above. Consequently, groundless differences in pay between men and women decrease in better-
governed companies, as measured by the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the 
presence of nomination-, remuneration-, and audit committees, as well as by the absence of CEO 
duality. Consequently, we conjecture that the pay gap is smaller in firms with better internal 
(board structure) corporate governance mechanisms. Previous research suggests that the 
compensation committee typically considers the specific tasks, seniority and experience, as well 
as the salary awarded at other firms in the same industry when determining a manager’s salary 
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(Geiler and Renneboog, 2011). Therefore, we conjecture that pay increases in position, age, as 
well as tenure, and depends on industry, for which we control in the analyses below. Concerning 
firm characteristics, past studies show that pay typically strongly increases with firm size and 
growth in sales (Murphy, 1985, Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and performance (Kaplan, 1994). 
Therefore, we conjecture that pay increases in firm size (here also proxied by index membership - 
FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE Small Cap), sales growth, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and free 
cash flow. 
 
4 Sample Selection and Data Description  
4.1  Sample and Data Sources 
Our sample includes virtually all listed UK firms. Our data result from merging three 
databases: (i) the Manifest database provides us with detailed information on the individual 
executive and non-executive directors: the presence of female directors (Female), director 
characteristics (Executive Director Age and Director Tenure), Remuneration (Total Pay, Base 
Salary, Bonus, Equity-based Pay), and governance data (Board size, Non-executive Directors (%), 
Female Directors (%), Audit Committee Presence, Nomination Committee Presence, 
Remuneration Committee Presence, Top-3 Remuneration Consultant Advice, CEO/Chairman 
Duality, Firm Risk), (ii) the BoardEx database is used to verify and complement the Manifest 
data, particularly in relation to the position characteristics (CEO, Deputy CEO, Executive 
Chairman, Finance Director, COO, Commercial Director) and (iii) Datastream from which we 
collect data on performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q), ownership structure (CEO Ownership, Executive 
Ownership (excl. CEO), Non-Executive Ownership, Corporate Ownership, Pension Fund 
Ownership, Individual & Families Ownership, Institutional Ownership), and various firm 
characteristics (Free Cash Flow, Sales Growth, Leverage), as well as index membership of 
corporations (FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE Small Cap) and the industry.  
 
 12
In total, we dispose of 45,639 individual-year observations for executive directors, 
including 12,011 CEO observations.2 The data set covers a time period of 12 years (from 1997 up 
until 2007).3  
 
4.2  Variable Description 
Compensation Measures 
The primary dependent variables comprise total year-end compensation and its 
components: (i) base salary, (ii) bonus, (iii) long-term incentive pay, calculated as the sum of the 
Black-Scholes value of stock options awarded and the total value of long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs), and (iv) the ratio of short-term versus long-term pay, calculated as base salary plus 
bonus, divided by long-term incentive pay. Figure 5 shows the remuneration and mean gender pay 
gap for executive directors (excluding the CEOs) for the whole sample and by corporate size 
(categorized by index membership: FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE Small Caps, and FTSE 
Fledglings). Across all firms, we first observe that the male executives earn about £494k, 
consisting of a fixed salary of £170k, an average bonus of £91k, £194k in equity-based pay, and 
about £40k in other types of compensation. Female executive directors earn on average about a 
quarter less – only £366k, and each of the pay components is lower than that of their male 
counterparts. A second observation from Figure 5 is the strong positive relation between firm size 
and remuneration: executive directors in the FTSE100 firms earn almost the double than FTSE250 
executives, three times as much as executives of FTSE Smallcaps, and about five times as much 
as the executives of FTSE Fledglings. Third, Figure 5 shows that the gender pay gap exists for all 
categories of companies, save the FTSE 100 firms. We show a similar graph for CEOs:  
                                                 
2 The CEO sample includes the highest-ranking director (e.g. managing director), in case the firm does not have a 
manager who is formally called the CEO. 
3 We made these adjustments to the financial year length: i) in case the reported financial year length deviates from 
the standard assumption of 365 days, we adjust the accounting and remuneration information accordingly, ii) when a 
financial year does not coincide with the reported calendar year, we apply the following rule: if the reported financial 
year end lies within the first six months of a given year, the entry belongs to the preceding calendar year, whereas 
when the yearend lies within the last six months of a given year, we relate the information to the current calendar 
year, and iii) to take care of inflation, all data are in 2007 real terms. The UK consumer price index UK is from the 
Office for National Statistics (http://www.ons.gov.uk). 
 
 13
Figure 6 shows the average total pay for male and female CEOs is very similar (£895k 
versus £909k) although the medians are more apart (£397k for male CEOs and £340k for female 
ones). The gender pay gap whereby male CEOs are paid more is significant for companies of 
different size categories (FTSE100, the FTSE Small Cap, and the FTSE Fledgling) – a male 
FTSE100 CEO earns on average a total of £2.74 million, while a female CEO earns £2.27 million. 
The pay gap is inversed for FTSE250 firms.  
    [Insert Figures 5 and 6, about here] 
 
Treatment and Discrimination Variables 
Our treatment variable is a dummy variable (Female) that is equal to one for a female 
executive director/CEO, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we will use the female dummy in our 
Tobit models (see below) to examine the effect of gender-based discrimination. In a second step, 
we interact our female dummy with a number of variables, such as: (i) corporate performance, (ii) 
managerial positions within the firm, and (iii) the advice of a top-3 remuneration consultancy.  
The control variables on executive position, director characteristics, governance, 
performance and risk, ownership concentration, and firm characteristics are enumerated in Section 
4.1. 
 
4.3  Treatment Effect Estimation 
To answer the question “Are female top managers discriminated in terms of pay based on 
their gender?”, we use treatment effect estimations to compare the average pay outcome e.g. the 
total compensation of females, under the supposed gender-based treatment (‘discrimination’) to 
the average pay outcome of males (‘controls’). If we were able to observe both pay outcomes for 
the same individual (e.g. a female executive), the average treatment effect (ATE) – the effect of 
gender-specific treatment - on compensation could be calculated as the difference in 
compensation between the individual under the treatment and the individual in the control sample. 
However, since we only observe female directors that receive a supposed gender-specific 
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treatment (discrimination in pay), we substitute the unobserved untreated female managers by 
male managers as our control group and estimate the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), which gives us the expected difference in compensation for a female director.  
To reduce the selection bias in our treatment effect estimation, we take into account a 
whole vector of variables including directors’ age and tenure, position, firm size, industry, and 
year. This enables us to compare the average difference in our pay variables of female and male 
managers who are similar in observed characteristics except gender. We assume that we observe 
all variables that affect both the treatment and the outcome (unconfoundedness assumption), and 
equally that we observe both treated and controls with similar values concerning the observed 
characteristics (overlap).4 That is, we assume that by conditioning on our set of observables, we 
are able to remove differences in the pay outcomes in the ‘untreated’ state between female and 
male executives. The unconfoundedness assumption states that the pay outcome in the ‘untreated’ 
case is independent of the treatment (gender-based discrimination), conditional on our set of 
observable characteristics. Put differently, the assumption is here that the pay of an executive 
director of the same age, position, experience, in a firm of similar size, in the same year and 
industry is unrelated to what it would be in the case of discrimination. According to Black and 
Smith (2003: 109): ”The key difference between matching and linear regression is that regression 
makes the additional assumption that simply conditioning linearly on X [the control] suffices to 
eliminate selection bias.” The overlap assumption means in our case that for each covariate, there 
must be an executive who does not get treated/discriminated.  
As manual matching on many covariates simultaneously is not straightforward, we 
calculate a single propensity score to reduce the number of dimensions to one (in line with 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). The propensity score expresses the propensity of the treatment 
given the observed covariates. For the estimation of the propensity score, we rely on a logit model 
of our observable characteristics on our treatment variable. We then match treated observations 
with controls similar in their propensity score. According to Rajeev and Wahba (2002), matching 
                                                 
4 Possible unobserved heterogeneity, such as position-related ability, negotiation skills, and motivation are taken up 
by the error term of the treatment effect estimation. 
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implies three major decisions: First, there is the choice of the applicable matching method. 
Nearest-neighbor matching is still the standard procedure - according to Sianesi (2011) who also 
discusses radius, kernel-based and local linear regression-based matching - in which an individual 
is matched to a control such that the distance between their propensity scores is minimized. 
Second, there is the issue of matching with or without replacement. Matching with replacement 
minimizes the distance between the propensity scores of the treated and control observations, 
which in turn leads to a lower bias, but the precision is typically lower than in the case of 
matching without replacement, and the final sample may comprise duplicate observations of the 
same match. In contrast, the downside of matching without replacement is that the order of 
matching may become important. By random ordering as well as by recalculating standard errors, 
the latter drawback is reduced (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). Third, one has to decide on the 
number of comparables: matching with a single comparable ensures the smallest distance in 
propensity scores between treated and control, and consequently yields the lowest bias but it 
decreases the precision (Rajeev and Wahba, 2002). In contrast, matching with several controls has 
the advantage that it is based on more information, which yields a higher precision, but it comes at 
the cost of a higher bias. 
The results in this paper are based on nearest-neighbor matching to minimize the bias in 
our estimation, and on single matching following the argument of Imbens (2004) that relying on a 
single match yields the lowest bias although at the cost of a small decrease in precision. We match 
without replacement after randomizing our observations and re-estimating standard errors using 
bootstrapping. To verify the robustness of our results, we subsequently also match with 
replacement, but the results do not change significantly. 
 
4.4  Tobit Regression 
As roughly one quarter of the executive directors and CEOs do not receive a bonus in a given 
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The dependent variable  is the logarithm of total compensation at year-end in real terms (at the 
end of our sample period). We also use as dependent variables (the natural logarithm of): (i) base 
salary, (ii) bonus, (iii) long-term pay, and (iv) short-term pay (sum of base salary and bonus) over 
long-term pay (equity-based pay). Female Presence will also be interacted with performance, 
position, and governance characteristics. The Position variables are equal to one if a director holds 
a certain position and the model also comprises Director Characteristics, Governance variables, 
Performance, Ownership- and Firm characteristics (for definitions, see Section 4.1). All 
regressions include sector and year dummies and we adjust all the standard errors for clustering at 
the position-level.   
5 Results 
5.1  Sample Statistics 
The median board of directors of UK listed companies comprises 9 directors (for FTSE 350 firms, 
the median is 11) with 4 executive directors (also 4 in FTSE 350 firms). In addition to the CEO, 
the finance director (CFO) is frequently a board member (in about 80% of the listed firms). Other 
executive directors on the board are the deputy CEO, the commercial director, the chief operating 
officer (COO), and an executive chairman (see Table 1, panel A). Only 2% of the CEOs in listed 
firms are women, and only 4% of the other executive directorships are occupied by female 
managers, most of which (85%) are CFOs.  
On average, the total compensation across all listed firms (from FTSE100 firms to FTSE 
Fledgings) awarded to executive directors (excluding the CEO) amounts to about £528,810, lower 
than that of a CEO who earns on average £801,280. Differences in remuneration between male 
and female executive directors (excl. CEO) occur both at the level of total pay and the various pay 
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components: male managers earn £418,650, more than female executives (£391,590), a difference 
largely driven by Base Salary and Bonus. Interestingly, total pay awarded to female CEOs 
(£865,010) typically exceeds (but not significantly so) that of their male counterparts (£619,200). 
The information from Figure 6 has revealed this does not occur across all types of firms but is 
limited to FTSE250 firms. Female CEOs compensation packages comprise a higher base salary 
(£251,020) and bonus (£159,120) than those of male managers. The data also show that CEOs are 
on average older and more experienced than the average executive director, and that female 
executive directors and CEOs are 4 to 5 years younger and have lower tenure in their position than 
their male counterparts (Panel A of Table 1). Sixteen percent of our executive director 
observations come for the FTSE100 firms, 31% from the FTSE250, 33% from the FTSE 
SmallCaps, and the remainder from the FTSE Fledglings.  
Firms with female executive directors dispose of larger boards, more frequently have a 
formal nomination committee and seek the advice of a top-3 remuneration consultant (lower for 
CEOs), and violate less frequently the separation of the positions of CEO and (non-executive) 
Chairman (see Table 1, Panel B). There is some difference in corporate performance between 
firms with and without female top managers whereby more profitable firms (in terms of Tobin’s 
Q) have more female top managers on the board. In the case of firms with female executive 
directors, lower equity stakes are held by executive directors, by individuals and families, and 
institutions. It seems that female directors are more likely to be on the board of firms with a higher 
leverage and board size, with fewer governance problems and with a better performance. 
In firms with female CEOs, we find more female directors, stronger performance (both in 
terms of accounting and stock price performance), stronger ownership concentration (in the hands 
of executive and non-executive directors, and other companies), lower leverage, and higher free 
cash flows (Panel B of Table 1). 




5.2  Treatment Effect Estimations 
 Female executives (who are not the CEO) do indeed receive a significantly lower 
compensation than male managers with the same position, age, experience (tenure) in a firm of 
similar size, and within the same industry, and in the same year (Column (1) of Table 2): their 
base salary is significantly lower by about £19,947 (or . 1  –15.13%); their bonus is 
£25,604 (or . 1 –19.75%) lower (in line with Kulich et al. (2011) who report that 
female CEOs earn -£33,510 less). As for incentive compensation (which is equity-based 
remuneration), we find the biggest difference between male and female directors: women top 
executives earn £222,043 (or . 1  –43.34%) less. Taken together, female executives 
earn a significant amount (of £269,069) less than the male executives with a similar profile. Over 
a five-year time span – which is the average tenure period of our sample of executive directors - 
the difference ascends to more than £1.3 million. All these results are statistically significant at the 
99%-confidence level.5  
The analysis shows that the total compensation of female CEOs is –22.74% lower for 
female CEOs (model (2) of Table 2), but this results is only significant at the 10% confidence 
level for two reasons: a. there are only relatively few female CEOs present in UK listed firms (218 
firm-years) and b. in some types of companies (based on index membership) the pay gap is 
negative while it is positive in others (Figure 6). When we delve deeper and examine the treatment 
effects for CEOs for FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE SmallCaps and FTSE Fledglings, we find no 
significant differences between male and female CEO’s total compensation and its components 
and structure (the only exception is that in SmallCaps, female CEOs earn less as they are given 
less equity-based pay). The fact remains that – contrary to what the raw data suggest – we hardly 
find any significant results when controlling for experience (tenure) in this position, age, firm size, 
time, and industry. Using propensity scores Bugeja, Matolscy and Spiropoulos (2012) also fail to 
find a gender pay gap at the CEO level for a sample of large US firms. 
                                                 
5 In column (1), the pay components as a percentage of total compensation for male and female top managers do not 
differ significantly as the female directors receive both less component compensation (the numerator) and less total 
compensation (the denominator). 
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Overall, the results show that the average female executive director receives significantly 
less pay, which is visible in all components of pay. This supports our hypothesis H1a, but this 
gender-related discrimination is restricted to executive directors excluding the CEO.  
[Insert Table 2, about here] 
 
5.3  Tobit Models 
As the compensation measures are left-censored, we examine whether the treatment effect results 
are upheld when estimating Tobit models to study differences in pay-for-performance for male 
and female top managers.  
 
The Compensation of Executive Directors and CEOs 
 We examine what determines total compensation (and its components) and adjust for year- 
and industry-fixed effects while also allowing for intra-group correlation by clustering the 
standard errors at the position level. Model (1) of Panel A in Table 3 shows that female executive 
directors receive a 17.3% lower total compensation than their male counterparts. This finding is 
roughly in line with the result from the treatment effect estimation of -12.54%. Consequently, 
these results fail to reject hypothesis H1a in that female executive directors earn less than male top 
managers. This gender pay gap in total pay is visible across all pay components: Base salary is 
12.3% lower (model (2)), Bonus is 24% less (model (3)), and Long-Term Pay is 33% less (model 
(4)). Model (5) shows that there is no difference in the pay structure, as proxied by the proportion 
of short-term on long-term pay: the reason is that both the numerator and denominator are lower 
for female managers. These results reject hypothesis H2a as although female directors’ short-term 
and long-term compensation are lower than those of male managers, the composition (the relative 
importance of short versus long term incentives) does not differ. 
 While the regressions correct for the managerial position (whereby the position of 
Executive Chairman is the left out benchmark), we observe that of all the executive directors 
(excluding the CEO), the deputy CEO is typically paid most (8.4% more than the executive 
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chairman, 10% more than the COO, about 17% more than the CFO, and 34% more than the 
commercial director) (see Model (1)). Models (2) to (4) show a similar picture for the differences 
in base salary, bonus, and equity-based pay, respectively, but exhibit more variation. Interestingly, 
the age of an executive director is negatively related to total compensation and its components, 
which suggests that experience is not priced in the remuneration contracts (note that the variable 
Tenure (in the position) is also not statistically significant). Model (5) demonstrates that younger 
executive directors are offered proportionally more Long-Term Pay which creates stronger 
incentives for them to focus on a longer time window to create value. An executive who is ten 
years younger than the average executive director receives 11% more total compensation (Model 
(1)). Although position tenure is not strongly related with age (these models do not suffer from 
multicollinearity), it is not significantly related to compensation.  
Various internal governance measures are correlated to higher compensation in all its 
forms (Models (1)-(4)): board size, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, and the 
percentage of female directors on the board. These variables are also related to compensation 
contracts that are geared more towards the equity-based pay rather than the short-term pay 
components (Model (5)). While the presence of an Audit Committee is related to a lower total 
compensation (Model (1)) and to higher long-term incentive pay (Models (4) and (5)), the 
presence of a remuneration committee is largely uncorrelated with total remuneration and its 
components (with exception of the bonus, which is lower in the presence of a remuneration 
committee (Model (3)). Although these control variables are significant when lagged, it is 
important to point out that we interpret the results as correlations and not as causations because 
the fact that the board comprises one or more female director does not necessarily mean that these 
female directors are instrumental in setting a higher compensation for the female executive or 
CEO. It may well be that the causality goes from good performance to the simultaneous adoption 
of good corporate governance practices (which may include striving for a gender balance at the 
board level) and the paying of higher compensation for top executives.  
Interestingly, when the advice of a top-3 remuneration consultant is sought, executive 
director remuneration is significantly higher (by 13.6%) as are the remuneration components; 
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Base Salary, Bonus, and LT-Pay rise by 7%, 12.4%, and 13.3%, respectively. This could imply 
that top remuneration consultants transfer pay increases in one firm or industry through rising 
benchmarks in their client networks and thus create a spiral of increasing compensation as 
suggested by Renneboog and Zhao (2011). CEOs who combine their function with that of 
chairman do not receive more total pay but receive a compensation package that is more geared 
towards the short-term pay (base salary and bonus) and receive lower equity based pay (Models 
(1) to (5)).  
We also demonstrate that executive directors leading risky firms are paid more; they 
receive higher base salaries (Model (2)) but also larger equity-based pay (Models (4)), and the 
long-term dimension of the contract dominates (Model (5)). Total compensation is 56% higher in 
firms where firm risk (as measured by the standard deviation of cash flows) is 10% higher than 
average. The performance variables indicate that compensation is strongly performance 
dependent: a 5% increase in accounting performance (ROA) is associated with a corresponding 
increase in the bonus of 8% (Model (3)) and in the LT-pay of 3% (Model (4)). Equity-based Pay 
is also positively associated with Tobin’s Q: a 10% increase in Tobin’s Q is related to a 37% 
higher LT-Pay (Model (4)). At the same time, a high Q is associated with a greater focus on Long-
Term Pay, as indicated by the coefficient of -0.049 for ST/LT-Pay (Model (5)).  
Ownership concentration held by outside shareholders such as corporations, individuals 
and families, as well as institutions are typically associated with lower (short and long term) 
compensation which implies that strong owners are restricting (excessive) remuneration. 
    [Insert Table 3, about here] 
 
 While controlling for age, board tenure, board structure, external consultant advice, 
performance, ownership concentration by type of shareholder, growth, firm size, risk and 
leverage, we show in Panel B of Table 3 that female CEOs are paid 8.4% less than male CEOs 
(Model (1)). This is mainly due to the fact that they receive an 8.2% lower Base Salary (but 
otherwise they receive similar bonuses and incentive pay). So, it seems that female CEOs face 
considerably less pay discrimination than the other female executive directors who are board 
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members. The results from Panel B are partially consistent with hypothesis H1a in that female 
CEOs earn less than male CEOs (but only in terms of base salary), and not with hypothesis H2a as 
the composition of the compensation contracts (short versus long term) is similar for male and 
female CEOs. 
 Older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure receive a compensation contract that is less 
long-term oriented (Models (4) and (5)). The governance variables yield similar results as the ones 
in the executive director regressions of Panel A. As before, while controlling for firm size, the 
presence of a top-3 remuneration consultant is related to a 15% increase in total compensation 
(and its components).  
Risky firms pay more, especially in terms of cash compensation: a firm which is 10% 
more risky pays a 9.3% higher total compensation to the CEO (Model (1)), a roughly 9% higher 
bonus (Model (3)) and focuses the CEO on the short-term (Model (5)). Panel B of Table 3 shows 
that CEO compensation is also performance-sensitive (both in terms of ROA and Q). In line with 
the findings for the executive directors, strong ownership concentration reduces total pay and the 
composition of remuneration. A CEO holding a large share stake receives lower total pay (Model 
(1)) and fewer long-term incentives may be necessary which is reflected in lower equity-based 
pay (Model (4)). When the firm experiences strong sales growth, larger bonuses and stronger 
incentive-based pay are granted but free cash flow is negatively associated with compensation in 
general, and especially with equity-based pay.  
 
Performance Sensitivity of Executive Directors and CEOs 
Is the compensation of female top managers more performance-sensitive than that of their 
male counterparts? We investigate this issue by including female director/CEO-performance 
interaction terms while adjusting for year and industry fixed effects and allowing for intra-group 
correlation by clustering the standard errors at the position level. Panel A of Table 4 confirms that 
(i) female executive directors are paid less and (ii) compensation is sensitive to performance 
(short-term performance depends on accounting measures and long-term performance on a 
market-based benchmark). Still, we reject hypothesis H2b because the compensation awarded to 
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female executive directors is not significantly less performance-sensitive than the one of male 
executives. Panel B of Table 4 presents the corresponding results for CEOs. While we find 
evidence which fails to reject hypotheses H1a (female CEOs earn less) and H2a (the 
compensation contracts are different with lower bonuses and lower long-term incentives for 
female CEOs), we also exhibit strongly significant differences in performance-sensitivity between 
female and male CEOs. In contrast to hypothesis H2b, however, female CEO remuneration 
contracts are not less but are actually more performance sensitive: both the interaction terms 
Female*ROA and Female*Tobin’s Q are positive and statistically significant for total 
compensation (Model 1), bonus (Model 3) and equity-based compensation (Model 4)).6  
    [Insert Table 4, about here] 
 
Female Non-Executive Directors on the Board 
We investigate whether the discrimination of female top managers is reduced if female 
non-executive directors serve on the board and examine whether the contract structure and 
performance sensitivity is different for such firms. We re-estimate the models in Tables 3 and 4, 
but we restrict the samples to those firms that have boards comprising female non-executive 
directors in the preceding year (when the compensation package was decided upon). Model (1) of 
Table 5 confirms that female executive directors are still discriminated in terms of total 
compensation: on average, their total compensation is about 10.9% lower than that of male 
executives. It should be noted that the discrimination is significantly less than in firms without 
female non-executive directors where female executives earn 17.3% less than their male 
colleagues (cf. Table 3, Panel A, Model (1)). When we investigate the compensation of a female 
CEO in a firm with at least one female non-executive director on the board (present at the time 
when the contract was made, thus in the previous year), we find that she receives a 20.2% higher 
total compensation than male CEOs (Model (3)).  
                                                 
6 When estimating marginal effects, we find these results to hold in all cases at the 1%-level of significance. 
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These results of Table 5 indicate a reduced discrimination for female executives by about 
6.4% (i.e. 17.3% minus 10.9%) in firms with female non-executive directors and no 
discrimination for female CEOs as female CEOs even earn more than their male CEOs. It is 
important to note that we do not state these findings in terms of causation: in other words, it may 
be that female non-executive directors are instrumental in providing their female executive 
colleagues a higher remuneration, but it could also be the case that firms that appoint female non-
executives do not discriminate female CEOs and executive directors in terms of compensation. 
We re-estimate Models (1) and (3) and include the female executive/CEO-performance 
interaction terms. Model (2) of Table 5 shows that, as for the whole sample, the contracts of 
female executives are not different in terms of performance-sensitivity from those of their male 
counterparts. In firms with at least one female non-executive director on the board, we 
demonstrate that the contracts offered to female CEOs are more sensitive to both accounting and 
market-based performance (Model (4)). These findings are in line with our hypothesis (H3) that 
the presence of female non-executive directors is correlated with a higher pay for female CEOs.  
Most of the coefficients of the control variables are similar to the ones of Tables 3 and 4, 
and are statistically significant. The advice of a top-3 remuneration consultant is related to an 
increase of roughly 11% for both executives and CEOs. The coefficients of both our ownership 
variables and our firm characteristics are comparable in direction, size, and significance with the 
results of our main model.  
[Insert Table 5, about here] 
 
The Effect of Industrial Segregation 
Is the gender pay gap larger in industries that employ a relatively high proportion of male 
managers? We first determine the industries with the largest employment of male executives, 
which are IT (22.6%), Food (17.0%), and Financial Services (10.9%). As before, we correct our 
models for industry effects and year-fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the position level. 
We document that a female executive director employed in an industry with a high proportion of 
male managers receives an average total remuneration which is 6.7% lower than that of male 
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executives (Model (1) of Table 6). This is a considerable smaller pay gap than what we observe in 
our main model (Table 3, Panel A, Model (1)). When we turn to CEOs in Model (3), we 
demonstrate that female CEOs receive on average a 7.4% higher total compensation. These results 
contradict hypothesis H1b, which states that the gender wage gap is larger in industries with a 
high concentration of male managers. The results for the other variables are largely comparable in 
size, sign, and significance to the results of our main models of Tables 3 and 4. 
[Insert Table 6, about here] 
 
The Effect of Remuneration Consultants 
We have already documented that when firms attract remuneration consultants to give pay 
advice, the total compensation (and the pay components) are higher. The question we now ask is 
whether remuneration consultants reduce the gender wage gap? Models (1) and (3) of Table 7 
show that female executive directors and female CEOs can expect to receive a total remuneration 
that is lower by about 11.8% and 27.8%, respectively. The remuneration of female executive 
directors (excluding the CEO) is not performance-sensitive, but the presence of remuneration 
consultants is negatively related to their pay. The picture for CEOs is very different: the female-
performance interaction terms are positive and statistically significant at the 1%-level, which 
implies that female managers’ compensation is more performance-sensitive. In addition, the 
female-interacted presence of a top-3 remuneration consultant is significantly and positively 
associated with total remuneration. In other words, the advice of a top-3 remuneration consultant 
seems to reduce the level of discrimination for female CEOs: she can then expect an increase that 
closes the remuneration gap. 
In sum, these results provide mixed evidence for our hypothesis H4 which states that top-3 
remuneration consultants reduce the pay gap: while we find this to be true for CEOs, it is not the 
case for the other executive directors on the board.  




5.4 Robustness Checks 
We perform some robustness checks to validate our results. For the sake of brevity, we do 
not report the associated tables.  
 
Matching with Replacement 
 Matching with replacement usually leads to a minimization of the distance between the 
propensity scores of the treated and the untreated, which typically results in a lower bias. 
However, the disadvantages of matching with replacement are that the precision is typically lower 
than in the case of matching without replacement and that the final sample consists of duplicate 
observations of the same match. A re-estimation of the treatment effect based on matching with 
replacement yields results that are qualitatively unaffected. 
 
Increasing the Number of Comparables 
In a second step, we not only employ 1-on-1 matching, but also rely on 1-on-3 matching, 
i.e. we compare the pay outcome of a female executive director to the average outcome of the 3 
closest male matches. Matching with a higher number of comparables has the advantage that one 
takes the information of more observations into account, which yields a higher precision, but 
trades this off with the introduction of a bias. Still, the results of our treatment effect estimation 
are very similar. 
 
Focusing on Newly Hired Executives 
In our current sample, we include all director observations independent of whether they 
have been hired recently or whether they have a high tenure in their firm. When we reestimate our 
main Tobit models of Tables 3-6 on a subsample of newly hired executive directors, we find that 
our results remain largely unaffected. 
 
6.  What about children? 
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The scarcity of family-related information and the unwillingness of (executive) directors to 
share such information creates a problem for this type of analysis as private characteristics are 
protected under English law from unauthorized disclosure. The fact that we have (no choice but) 
to rely on director’s self-reported information introduces a selection bias, such that the results 
should be interpreted with caution. We collect all available private information from two leading 
bibliographical databases (Who’s Who UK, and Marquis Who’s Who)7 for our sample of female 
executive directors and the matched sample of male managers. We then tried to complement this 
information, by gathering mail addresses from CapitalIQ and sending out 1,078 questionnaires by 
snail mail as well as a reminder via email. The response rate was a mere 3.7%8 with 27 men and 
13 women responding to the survey. We measure the effect of children by means of binary 
variables capturing whether a director has children (1) or not (0). The marital status variable 
equals one in case of marriage9. Panel A of Table 8 (‘original data’) shows the descriptive 
statistics of the data on children (including adoptive children). We have 895 director-year 
observations for 733 male and 162 female managers. We have not a single man without children, 
and also do not observe female directors with more than 4 children. The average male and female 
director has 2 children. Panel B indicates around 60% of both male and females are married.  
[Insert Table 8, about here] 
 
An endogeneity problem may arise in that the decision to have a child or to get married 
may not be independent from an individual’s professional potential. However, the survivorship 
bias in our sample may not be a problem as long as one realizes that we study the pay gap of male 
and female executives who made a successful career and reached the top of the corporate 
hierarchy. We thus study the relation between the pay gap and remuneration conditional on 
                                                 
7 Who’s Who UK is a bibliographical database on more than 30,000 individuals in the UK and is published annually 
since 1849. Marquis Who’s Who have been collecting biographical data since 1899 and include information on 
corporate executives from around the world.  
8 This result may not surprise because directors have no interest to provide private information, as some who were 
manager/director at one point in our sample period had left the company and it was often against company policy to 
participate in surveys or to forward the questionnaire to the manager (which happened in 11.1% of the cases).  
9 The relation between divorce and career (and remuneration) would be hard to test given the small number of 
divorces in our sample (which may be subject to disclosure bias). 
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proven career success. A study on parenthood at the early stages of a career and the career 
evolution is beyond the scope of this study. 
In order to address the problem of survey non-response, we turn to Multiple Imputation 
(MI), which can make reliable randomization-based inferences on missing values (Barnard and 
Rubin, 1999) and is more efficient than list-wise deletion that may result in larger standard errors, 
and hence wider confidence intervals and lower explanatory power. In our case, data is missing 
due to various reasons, including but not limited to the willingness to give away information on 
private characteristics. Missing information on the number of children or on marriage may also 
depend on gender, age, and position of an individual – variables that are present in the dataset. 
Therefore, we consider our data to be missing at random (MAR) – a precondition for MI.10 While 
treating the imputed values as known in the analysis often underestimates the variance of the 
estimates and overstates precision, this problem is accounted for by the creation of multiple 
imputations, i.e. generating different sets of plausible values for the missing data. There seems to 
be consensus that five imputations may be sufficient to obtain valid inferences (Schafer and 
Olsen, 1998; van Buuren et al., 1999). Panel A of Table 9 reports the average compensation of all 
executives with and without children. Whereas only 2% of the male executives do not have 
children, almost 18% of the female executives are not parents. We observe that total remuneration 
and all its components are higher when male and female managers have children  
(relative to managers without children). The difference in average salaries between male and 
female managers without children is large, with the former earning £382k more. Similarly, the 
difference in average total pay for managers who are parents also suggests a pay gap of £291k. 
Panel B shows the average compensation by marital status. Base salary, bonus, and total 
compensation are significantly higher for married female managers than those of unmarried 
female executives, but do not differ significantly between male and female directors. These 
                                                 
10 Even though we may expect departures from MAR, the performance of MI is unlikely to be seriously reduced 
(Schafer and Graham, 2009). In fact, even an erroneous assumption of MAR may have a very limited effect on 
estimates and standard errors (Collins, Schafer, and Kam, 2001). 
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descriptive statistics give some initial insights but call for a more thorough matching analysis the 
results of which we show in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 9, about here] 
 
 Model (1) in Table 10 presents the results of a treatment effect analysis on the imputed 
sample of executive directors (excluding CEOs) and shows that virtually all components of pay 
are lower for female managers. Notably, we observe a 16.4% reduction (–£21,454) in base salary, 
a 26.5% reduction (–£40,394) in bonus, a 57.5% reduction (–£98,461) in equity-based 
compensation, as well as a 16.6% reduction (–£161,011) in total compensation. In short, these 
results are very similar to our main model (Model (1) of Table 2), which gives credibility to the 
results based on the smaller sample with imputed data. Model (2) of Table 10 captures the pay gap 
after accounting for parenthood. We observe that having children does not close the pay gap: the 
wage gap in base salary is even somewhat larger (–£39,394) corresponding to a reduction in base 
salary of roughly 25%; the bonus gap is somewhat smaller (–£36,253) and is equivalent to a lower 
bonus of -36%; but the equity-based pay gap is large and amounts to 64.8% or –£186,000. 
Consequently, for female managers the total compensation is 33% lower which stands for an 
amount of –£267,059 per annum. Model (3) accounts for matching based on marital status which 
is strongly correlated with the variable children as our data do not comprise female managers with 
children who were not/had not been married. Therefore, marital status does not close the pay gap 
either: base salary remains £27,902 lower, equity-based pay is £132,070 lower, and total 
compensation is £195,182 lower, representing a reduction of 23.2%.11  
We conclude that neither the number of children nor marital status close the observed 
gender pay gap for top executives (excluding the CEO). On the contrary, for married female 
managers with children, the pay gap is even larger. It is possible that the parenthood decision 
                                                 
11 In order to assure that our analysis holds, we not only perform the treatment effect analysis on the average of our 
imputed dataset, but also on all the imputed data, as well as on our original dataset using mean substitution. Our 
results remain in all cases very similar. 
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harms the female career at the early career stages and that these arrears are never made up even by 
successful female managers who reach the top of their profession.12  
 [Insert Table 10, about here] 
7 Conclusion and Discussion 
The existence of the gender wage gap and the possible causes thereof remain an important 
and hotly debated topic. The literature proposes an impressive range of theories that may help to 
explain the existence of a gender wage gap, such as the ‘sticky floors’ idea (Booth et al., 2003), 
the ‘glass-ceiling’ concept (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2005), occupational and industrial 
segregation (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1994, Allen and Sander, 2002), the impact of corporate 
performance (Kulich et al., 2011), behavioral biases (e.g. Eagly et al., 1992, Eagly and Karau, 
2002, Kulich et al., 2011), and the effect of pay consultants (e.g. Bender, 2003, Cadman et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, empirical testing of these theories remains limited, because the numbers of 
female top managers remains scarce. 
To address the idea of female discrimination at the pay level, we have built a very large 
dataset that includes details on the compensation of male and female executive directors for 
virtually all companies listed in the UK from 1996 until the start of the financial crisis (end of 
2007). This enables us to put many of the above-mentioned ideas on the gender pay gap to the test 
and examine discriminatory practices for top level managers: CEOs and the other executive 
directors. We study whether differences are attributable to occupation and segregation, differences 
in pay-for-performance sensitivity, corporate governance structures, ownership structure, and the 
influence of remuneration consultants. 
We use a treatment effect estimation to compare the average pay e.g. in total compensation 
of female top managers (CEOs and other executive directors), under a gender-based treatment 
(‘discrimination’) to the average pay outcome of male top managers (‘controls’) that are similar in 
                                                 





a number of observable characteristics. In particular, we control for firm size, position (CEO, 
finance director, commercial director, COO, and others), experience (age and tenure in that 
position), industry, and time. The advantage of a treatment effect estimation over and above a 
simple OLS regression is that we do not assume a linear relationship between our independent 
variables and the level of pay, but instead we account for heterogeneity among individuals. The 
results of the treatment effect analysis confirm that female executive directors (excluding the 
CEO) are discriminated against in their base salary, bonus, long-term incentive compensation, and 
hence also in the total level of compensation. For example, female executive directors can on 
average expect to receive a 15% lower salary and 20% lower bonus, which translates respectively 
into about £20k and £25k less pay. The largest difference is in equity-based pay, which is £222k 
lower than for the male executive directors (which do not comprise the CEOs). When correcting 
for the above mentioned observable characteristics (experience, industry, etc.), we find that 
female executives seem to be strongly discriminated as they earn about £269k less per year. As in 
our database that includes all the executive directors of listed UK companies, the average tenure is 
about 5 years, female directors are paid £1.3 million too little over this period. In terms of the 
contract structure – a focus on short or long term pay -  the contracts do not differ.  
Remarkably, this gender-based discrimination seems to be largely restricted to executive 
directors, as we do not find compelling evidence that the total compensation and the components 
of pay significantly differ between male and female CEOs. These results suggest indeed that 
gender equality in terms of pay at the very top – the CEO level - has been (nearly) achieved, but it 
also suggests that female executive directors at the sub-top level (but still at board level) continue 
to be discriminated. The reason for the discrimination at the executive director level but not at the 
CEO level is that executive directors are less visible as they are not the figureheads of the 
corporation. 
 We document that the contracts of female CEOs are more sensitive to both accounting and 
share price performance. This contradicts the findings of Kulich et al. (2011) who argue that 
female managers are considered to be more risk averse and are consequently offered contracts 
with lower performance sensitivity. As the other executive directors may be considered as less 
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responsible for the overall bottom line results, we find that their compensation is indeed less 
performance-sensitive.  
 Do female non-executive directors on the board improve the situation for the female 
managers? Our analysis shows that the gender-based pay gap is indeed somewhat lower in such 
firms. While some would regard this as evidence to plead for a minimum ratio of women on the 
board to tackle gender-based discrimination, it is important to interpret this result with caution 
because our analysis cannot discern how active non-executive female directors are in terms of 
reducing the glass ceiling and the female pay discrimination. It may be that it takes a specific type 
of firm (with corporate governance standards aiming at reducing gender imbalances) that both 
hires female non-executive directors and pays female and male top managers similar salaries 
(while controlling for those managers’ specificities). Whereas Adams and Ferreira (2009) show 
that with a greater number of women on the board, both the board meetings’ attendance ratio and 
forced CEO turnover in case of poor performance improves, they caution that gender diversity 
may have a negative impact on profitability and share prices. Moreover, recent Norwegian 
evidence suggests that the introduction of gender quotas incite firms to delist or avoid specific 
types of incorporation where gender quota are required as they want to avoid the high costs 
related to involuntary and potentially suboptimal board restructuring (Øyvind and Staubo, 2013). 
Lastly, when contemplating the introduction of binding gender quotas, it should be kept in mind 
that the pipeline of qualified women with sufficient experience at the upper management level 
may need to be built up in due time (in all listed UK companies, only 2% of the CEOs and 4% of 
all executive directors are female). Nevertheless, the introduction of a female quota may also send 
a strong signal to female executives by encouraging them to overcome the glass ceiling and 
thereby contribute to enhanced gender equality. 
When examining industries with a high concentration of male executives, however, we 
observe that the gender wage gap is not greater which contradicts the idea that women are less 
appreciated in a dominantly male environment (as suggested by Allen and Sander (2002)). We 
also document that seeking the advice of top remuneration consultants substantially drives up total 
remuneration, and is beneficial for female CEOs as the pay gap is reduced in such firms. 
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However, we only find a pay gap reduction for female CEOs, but not for the female executive 
directors. 
We study whether marital status and parenthood can explain the gender pay gap. We find 
that the pay gap for female managers who are married and who have children is larger (£267k and 
£ 195k per annum, respectively) than for managers without children.  
Can we explain some of the remaining gender wage gap by position-related ability, 
negotiation skills, and level of motivation? Are the career choices of women conscious decisions 
taken at the household level? To what extent are the (male-oriented) expectations about the 
required managerial skills and the idea of femininity important to women and influence their 
professional life? Further research on those aspects of female participation to the top managerial 
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Figure 1 Average Total Compensation Evolution of Top Managers in Listed UK Companies. 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the average total compensation over time for both male and female top 
managers who are members of the board of directors of listed UK companies. The numbers are given in 
£1,000. Source: Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 
 
 
Figure 2 Average Basic Salary Evolution of Top Managers in Listed UK Companies. 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the mean basic salary over time for both male and female top managers who are 
members of the board of directors of listed UK companies. The average basic salary is given in £1,000. Source: 













































Figure 3 Average Bonus Evolution of Top Managers in Listed UK Companies. 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the total mean bonus over time for both male and female top managers 
who are members of the board of directors of listed UK companies. The average bonus is given in £1,000. 
Source: Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 
 
 
Figure 4 Average Long-term Compensation Evolution of Top Managers in Listed UK Companies. 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the total long-term incentive compensation over time for both male and 
female top managers who are members of the board of directors of listed UK companies. The average 
salary is given in £1,000. Long-Term incentive compensation is calculated as the sum of the Black-
Scholes value of stock options and the total value of LTIPs (Long term incentive plans). The numbers are 













































Figure 5 Executive Directors (excl. CEOs): Average Total Pay by Index and Gender. 
 
The figure illustrates the average pay gap between male and female executive directors (excl. CEOs) for the 
sample and by index membership (FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap, FTSE Fledgling). Source: Own 
calculations based on Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 
 
Figure 6 CEOs: Average Total Pay by Index and Gender. 
    
 
The figure illustrates the average pay gap between male and female CEOs for the sample and by index 
membership (FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap, FTSE Fledgling). Source: Own calculations based 


















































Table 1 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Director Characteristics. 
Panel A presents the director characteristics for the samples of executive directors (excl. CEOs) and CEOs, based on director-year observations. Panel B shows 
the firm characteristics for firms with only male executive directors/a male CEO, and for firms with one or more female executive directors/a female CEO (based 
on firm-year observations). Both Panel A and Panel B also present tests on the differences in means. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level are 
denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively, for the difference between the mean descriptive statistics of firms with only male executives vs firms that have one or 
more female executive director; and firms with a male CEO vs firms with a female CEO. The data are from from Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 
  Executives (excl. CEOs) CEOs 
  All Male only Includes a Female All Male CEO  Female CEO 
Positions             
Deputy CEO 0.06 0.06 0.04***    
Executive Chairman 0.07 0.08 0.01***    
Finance Director 0.78 0.78 0.85***    
Commercial Director 0.01 0.01 0.02***    
COO 0.04 0.04 0.05*    
Other Executives 0.03 0.03 0.02    
Remuneration             
Total Compensation (in £1,000) 528.81 418.65 391.59 801.28 619.20 865.01 
Base Salary (in £1,000) 183.98 161.99 146.39*** 242.88 207.53 251.02*** 
Bonus (in £1,000) 96.28 73.86 65.15 145.51 108.09 159.12** 
LT-Pay (in £1,000) 205.88 148.35 143.99 370.94 267.89 371.41 
ln(ST-Pay/LT-Pay) 0.60 0.68 0.80 0.52 0.56 0.54 
Director Characteristics             
Director Age 49.59 49.59 45.00*** 52.82 53.11 47.64*** 
Director Tenure 5.12 5.28 4.23*** 5.76 5.88 4.19*** 
FTSE100 0.16 0.09 0.11** 0.09 0.04 0.08*** 
FTSE250 0.31 0.31 0.25*** 0.25 0.23 0.22 
FTSE Small Cap 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.36 
Female Presence             
Female 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Number of Observations 35,307 23,049 1,384 15,167 11,153 301 
 
 
Table 1 Panel B: Descriptive Statistics: Firm Characteristics. 
  
All Firms with only 
male executive 
directors 
Firms with one 
or more female 
executive 
director 




Governance             
Board Size 9.02 8.30 10.42*** 9.02 9.02 9.17 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 55.94 54.55 58.63*** 55.93 55.88 58.41 
Female Directors (%) 4.75 0.00 13.94*** 4.75 4.42 22.27*** 
Audit Committee Presence 1.00 0.99 1.00*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.83 0.80 0.88*** 0.83 0.83 0.70*** 
Remuneration Committee 
Presence 1.00 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 1.00 0.99 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.45 0.42 0.51*** 0.45 0.45 0.34** 
CEO/Chairman Duality 0.09 0.10 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.00*** 
Firm Risk 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.37 
Performance             
Return on Assets (Median) 4.26 4.46 3.87 4.26 4.24 5.81 
Tobin's Q (Median) 2.05 1.97 2.22*** 2.05 2.04 2.61** 
Ownership             
CEO Ownership 2.62 3.03 1.83*** 2.62 2.63 2.06 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) 2.43 2.61 2.08** 2.44 2.38 5.09*** 
Non-Executive Ownership 2.21 2.19 2.24 2.21 2.13 6.71*** 
Corporate Ownership 8.07 8.17 7.87 8.06 7.97 12.72*** 
Pension Fund Ownership 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.26 
Individual & Families Ownership 2.12 2.31 1.75*** 2.13 2.14 1.18 
Institutional Ownership 21.97 22.78 20.40*** 21.97 21.95 22.92 
Firm Characteristics             
Free Cash Flow/Assets 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09*** 
Sales Growth 0.14 0.15 0.12*** 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Leverage 0.67 0.61 0.80*** 0.67 0.68 0.36*** 
Number of Observations 5,599 3,689 1,910 5,585 5,480 105 
 
Table 2 Treatment Effect Estimations on Total Compensation and its Components. 
This table presents the results of a treatment effect estimation on various pay components (Base Salary, 
ln(Base Salary), Base Salary/Total Compensation, Bonus, ln(Bonus), Bonus/Total Compensation, 
Bonus/Base Salary, Incentive Compensation (the sum of stock options and LTIPs), ln (Incentive 
Compensation), Incentive Compensation/Total Compensation, Total Compensation, ln(Total 
Compensation), and Total Compensation/Base Salary) for executive directors excluding CEOs (Column 
(1)) and CEOs (Column (2)). We compare the pay outcome of directors who are similar in age, tenure, 
position, firm size, industry, and year. The treatment effect is the variable Female. Standard errors are given 
in brackets; 10%, 5%, or 1% are denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. The data are from Boardex, 
Datastream, and Manifest. 
    
(1) 





Dependent variable:   Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
            
Base Salary   -19.947*** 0.000 -21.168 0.246 
    (4.530)   (18.252)   
Ln(Base Salary)    -0.164*** 0.000 -0.099 0.215 
    (0.032)   (0.080)   
Base Salary/Total Compensation   1.016 0.372 2.938 0.334 
    (1.150)   (3.038)   
Bonus   -25.604*** 0.009 -35.434 0.290 
    (9.756)   (33.517)   
Ln(Bonus)   -.220*** 0.000 0.065 0.705 
    (0.063)   (0.172)   
Bonus/Total Compensation   -0.028 0.970 -2.551 0.149 
    (0.722)   (1.766)   
Bonus/Base Salary   -7.022 0.359 -45.566 0.133 
    (7.662)   (30.297)   
Incentive Compensation   -222.043*** 0.000 -32.639 0.900 
    (51.426)   (214.756)   
Ln(Incentive Compensation)   -0.568*** 0.000 0.139 0.775 
    (0.162)   (0.485)   
Incentive Compensation/Total Compensation   -0.956 0.326 0.126 0.966 
    (0.973)   (2.968)   
Total Compensation   -269.069*** 0.000 116.319 0.669 
    (53.748)   (272.314)   
Ln(Total Compensation)   -0.134*** 0.004 -0.258* 0.055 
    (0.046)   (0.134)   
Total Compensation/Base Salary   -46.998 0.886 -119.679 0.971 
    (112.969)   (988.955)   
Table 3 The Determinants of Executive Director and CEO Compensation. 
This table presents the results of Tobit regressions on various compensation measures (in log-terms) for 
executive directors (excl. CEOs) in Panel A and for CEOs in Panel B. LT-Pay is defined as the sum of the 
Black and Scholes value of stock options and total LTIPs. ST-Pay is defined as the sum of Base Salary 
and Bonus. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The data are from Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 
 Panel A: Determinants of 











Constant 4.791*** 5.065*** 4.602*** 3.211*** 2.277** 
Female Presence 
Female -0.173*** -0.123*** -0.240*** -0.327*** 0.251 
Positions 
Deputy CEO 0.084*** -0.134** -0.021 0.199 -0.163 
Finance Director -0.091*** -0.218*** -0.297*** -0.246*** 0.079*** 
Commercial Director -0.257*** -0.314*** -0.457*** -0.369*** 0.089 
COO -0.016 -0.174** -0.171 -0.212 0.218 
Other Executives -0.183 -0.215** -0.192** -0.098 -0.162 
Director Characteristics 
Director Age -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.008*** 
Director Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.005 
Governance 
Board Size 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.048*** -0.037*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.014*** -0.007*** 
Female Directors (%) 0.002** 0.001** 0.003 0.006** -0.004 
Audit Committee Presence -0.521*** -0.497*** -0.847*** 0.488** -1.099*** 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.214*** 0.148*** 0.105 0.193*** -0.024 
Remuneration Committee Presence 0.659 0.153 -0.908** -0.233 0.301 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.136*** 0.070*** 0.124*** 0.133*** -0.075 
CEO/Chairman Duality -0.012 0.411*** 0.238*** -0.899*** 1.436*** 
Firm Risk 0.056*** 0.047** 0.024 0.118*** -0.212*** 
Performance 
ROA 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.006* -0.003 
Tobin's Q -0.002 0.008 0.037*** -0.049*** 
Ownership 
CEO Ownership -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.011* 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.004*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.007*** 0.006*** 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.001 
Corporate Ownership -0.002*** -0.002*** 0 -0.004*** 0.002 
Pension Fund Ownership 0.001 0.001 -0.033*** 0.012 -0.024** 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.005*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.012*** 0.012*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.002* 
Firm Characteristics 
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.256* 0.304*** -0.465*** -1.167*** 1.604*** 
Sales Growth 0.042*** -0.005 0.171*** 0.024 0.228* 
Leverage 0.065*** 0.046*** 0.024* -0.006 0.027 
FTSE100 1.022*** 0.666*** 1.068*** 1.023*** -0.422*** 
FTSE250 0.486*** 0.320*** 0.489*** 0.485*** -0.220*** 
FTSE Small Cap 0.088*** 0.051*** 0.02 0.012 -0.004 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.186 0.194 0.165 0.137 0.052 




Table 3 (Continued). 












Constant 2.871*** 4.144*** 5.025*** 2.432*** 1.315** 
Female Presence           
Female -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.03 0.003 -0.085 
Director Characteristics           
CEO Age -0.002 0.006*** 0.002 -0.005*** 0.017*** 
CEO Tenure -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.007*** 0.017*** 
Governance           
Board Size 0.050*** 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.054*** -0.018*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.013*** -0.008*** 
Female Directors (%) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002 
Audit Committee Presence 0.003 0.085 -0.935*** 1.324*** -0.650*** 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.217*** 0.144*** 0.055 0.228*** -0.261*** 
Remuneration Committee Presence 1.656 -0.320*** -1.319*** -0.560*** 0.088 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.148*** 0.075*** 0.112*** 0.112*** -0.037 
CEO/Chairman Duality 0.033* 0.037*** 0.240*** 0.290*** -0.550*** 
Firm Risk 0.093*** 0.038** 0.089*** 0.004 0.048*** 
Performance           
ROA 0.010***   0.018*** 0.005*** 0.001 
Tobin's Q 0.000   0.007 0.035*** -0.033*** 
Ownership           
CEO Ownership -0.006** -0.002* -0.005 -0.005** 0.004 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.005 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.008 0.002 
Corporate Ownership 0 0 0 -0.002*** 0.004*** 
Pension Fund Ownership -0.009 -0.004 -0.022 -0.010* -0.007 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.006*** -0.003*** 0 -0.005*** 0.004* 
Institutional Ownership 0.001 0 0.001*** -0.001 0.002** 
Firm Characteristics           
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.239** 0.199*** -0.262** -0.302** 0.197 
Sales Growth -0.02 -0.082*** 0.184*** 0.085** -0.115 
Leverage 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.004 0.026*** -0.030** 
FTSE100 1.190*** 0.693*** 1.242*** 1.188*** -0.585*** 
FTSE250 0.551*** 0.346*** 0.569*** 0.542*** -0.220*** 
FTSE Small Cap 0.117*** 0.050** 0.157*** -0.051*** 0.194*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.296 0.521 0.192 0.137 0.041 





Table 4 Performance Sensitivity of Executive Director and CEO Compensation. 
This table presents the results of Tobit regressions on the components of pay (in log-terms) for executive 
directors (excl. CEOs) in Panel A, and for CEOs in Panel B. LT-Pay is the sum of the Black and Scholes 
value of stock options and total LTIPs. ST-Pay is the sum of Base Salary and Bonus. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. The data are from 
Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 












Constant 4.784*** 11.839*** 4.591*** 3.210*** 2.277** 
Female Presence           
Female -0.126*** -0.122*** -0.199* -0.336*** 0.257 
Female * ROA -0.002   -0.001 0.004 -0.002 
Female * Tobin's Q -0.014   -0.012 0.001 -0.001 
Positions           
Deputy CEO 0.085*** -0.137** -0.021 0.199 -0.163 
Finance Director -0.091*** -0.219*** -0.296*** -0.246*** 0.079*** 
Commercial Director -0.255*** -0.314*** -0.455*** -0.368*** 0.088 
COO -0.016 -0.174** -0.171 -0.212 0.218 
Other Executives -0.183 -0.215** -0.192** -0.098 -0.162 
Director Characteristics           
Director Age -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.008*** 
Director Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.005 
Governance           
Board Size 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.048*** -0.037*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.014*** -0.007*** 
Female Directors (%) 0.002** 0.001** 0.003 0.006*** -0.004 
Audit Committee Presence -0.522*** -0.497*** -0.849*** 0.487** -1.098*** 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.214*** 0.148*** 0.105 0.194*** -0.024 
Remuneration Committee Presence 0.664 0.153 -0.899** -0.232 0.301 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.136*** 0.070*** 0.124*** 0.133*** -0.075 
CEO/Chairman Duality -0.013 0.413*** 0.237*** -0.900*** 1.436*** 
Firm Risk 0.056*** 0.046** 0.025 0.118** -0.212*** 
Performance           
ROA 0.008***   0.016*** 0.006 -0.003 
Tobin's Q -0.001   0.008 0.037*** -0.049*** 
Ownership           
CEO Ownership -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.011* 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.004*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.007*** 0.006*** 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.001 
Corporate Ownership -0.002*** -0.002*** 0 -0.004*** 0.002 
Pension Fund Ownership 0.001 0.001 -0.033*** 0.012 -0.024** 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.005*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.012*** 0.012*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.002* 
Firm Characteristics           
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.255* 0.305*** -0.464*** -1.166*** 1.603*** 
Sales Growth 0.042*** -0.006 0.171*** 0.025 0.228* 
Leverage 0.065*** 0.046*** 0.024* -0.006 0.027 
FTSE100 1.021*** 0.666*** 1.068*** 1.023*** -0.423*** 
FTSE250 0.486*** 0.320*** 0.489*** 0.485*** -0.220*** 
FTSE Small Cap 0.088*** 0.050*** 0.02 0.012 -0.004 
Year and Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.186 0.197 0.165 0.137 0.052 




Table 4 (continued). 












Constant 2.876*** 10.913*** 5.041*** 2.450*** 0.83 
Female Presence           
Female -0.157*** -0.082*** -0.291*** -0.168** 0.022 
Female * ROA 0.011***   0.018*** 0.002** 0.025*** 
Female * Tobin's Q 0.005**   0.036*** 0.041*** -0.077*** 
Director Characteristics           
CEO Age -0.002 0.006*** 0.002 -0.005*** 0.018*** 
CEO Tenure -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.007*** 0.016*** 
Governance           
Board Size 0.050*** 0.034*** 0.051*** 0.054*** -0.018*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.013*** -0.008*** 
Female Directors (%) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002 
Audit Committee Presence 0.004 0.085 -0.930*** 1.317*** -0.650*** 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.218*** 0.144*** 0.058 0.233*** -0.268*** 
Remuneration Committee Presence 1.653 -0.320*** -1.321*** -0.561*** 0.085 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.148*** 0.075*** 0.112*** 0.112*** -0.037 
CEO/Chairman Duality 0.033** 0.037*** 0.241*** 0.291*** -0.552*** 
Firm Risk 0.092*** 0.038** 0.089*** 0.002 0.048*** 
Performance           
ROA 0.010***   0.018*** 0.005*** 0.001 
Tobin's Q -0.001   0.005 0.034*** -0.032*** 
Ownership           
CEO Ownership -0.006** -0.002* -0.005 -0.005** 0.004 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.005 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.008 0.002 
Corporate Ownership 0 0 0 -0.002*** 0.004*** 
Pension Fund Ownership -0.009 -0.004 -0.022 -0.010* -0.007 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.006*** -0.003*** 0 -0.005*** 0.004* 
Institutional Ownership 0.001 0 0.001*** -0.001 0.002** 
Firm Characteristics           
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.237** 0.199*** -0.262** -0.309** 0.205 
Sales Growth -0.02 -0.082*** 0.184*** 0.084** -0.119 
Leverage 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.005 0.027*** -0.030** 
FTSE100 1.191*** 0.693*** 1.244*** 1.189*** -0.586*** 
FTSE250 0.551*** 0.346*** 0.566*** 0.540*** -0.220*** 
FTSE Small Cap 0.117*** 0.050** 0.155*** -0.053*** 0.196*** 
Year and Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.296 0.525 0.192 0.137 0.042 
Number of Observations 4529 4496 3321 2522 2503 
 
Table 5 The Effect of Female Non-Executive Directors on the Board. 
This table presents the results of a Tobit regression of ln(total compensation) for executives (excl. CEOs) and CEOs, 
conditional on the presence of one or more female non-executive directors on the board at (t-1). Model (1) is the 
standard Tobit and Model (2) includes interactions between Female and the performance variables (ROA, Tobin’s 
Q). The excluded benchmark position is that of Executive Chairman. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% 
level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. The data are from Boardex, Datastream, and Manifest. 
  Executives (excl. CEOs) CEOs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 5.211*** 5.061*** 5.148*** 5.162*** 
Female Presence         
Female -0.109** -0.097 0.202*** 0.019*** 
Female * ROA   0.011   0.018*** 
Female * Tobin's Q   -0.02   0.020*** 
Positions         
Deputy CEO 0.249*** 0.251*** 
Finance Director -0.026 -0.027     
Commercial Director -0.223** -0.199**     
COO 0.05 0.053     
Other Executives -0.037 -0.037     
Director Characteristics         
Director/CEO Age -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
Director/CEO Tenure 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
Governance         
Board Size 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
Female Directors (%) -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
Audit Committee Presence         
Nomination Committee Presence 0.356*** 0.353*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 
Remuneration Committee Presence -0.011 -0.01 -0.196*** -0.196*** 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 
CEO/Chairman Duality     0.027 0.025 
Firm Risk 0.031 0.032 0.000 -0.007 
Performance         
ROA 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
Tobin's Q 0.008 0.008* -0.002 -0.004 
Ownership         
CEO Ownership -0.002 -0.003 -0.014 -0.015 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
Corporate Ownership -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
Pension Fund Ownership -0.016** -0.015** -0.024 -0.027 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.006* -0.004* -0.007*** -0.009*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001* 
Firm Characteristics         
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.408 -0.415 -0.273** -0.328*** 
Sales Growth 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.109** 0.095** 
Leverage 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
FTSE100 0.889*** 0.888*** 1.131*** 1.133*** 
FTSE250 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.338*** 0.337*** 
FTSE Small Cap -0.027 -0.026 -0.046*** -0.048*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.183 0.183 0.346 0.347 
Number of Observations 3986 3986 1061 1061 
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Table 6 Industrial Segregation and the Gender Pay Gap. 
This table presents the results of a Tobit regression on ln(total compensation) for both the executives (excl. CEOs) 
and the CEOs, including interaction terms between the variable Female and the Performance variables (ROA, Tobin’s 
Q). The analysis is restricted to those industries with the largest employment of male executives. The significance of 
the results at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
   Executives (excl. CEOs) CEOs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 4.644*** 4.646*** 4.498*** 4.896*** 
Female Presence   
Female -0.067*** -0.016 0.074* 0.032 
Female * ROA   -0.006   0.000 
Female * Tobin's Q   -0.011   0.011 
Positions         
Deputy CEO 0.141*** 0.142*** 
Finance Director -0.082* -0.081*     
Commercial Director -0.300*** -0.298***     
COO 0.005 0.005     
Other Executives -0.096 -0.096     
Director Characteristics         
Director/CEO Age -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
Director/CEO Tenure 0.005* 0.005* 0.002 0.002 
Governance         
Board Size 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
Female Directors (%) 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Audit Committee Presence -0.521*** -0.522*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.214*** 0.216*** 
Remuneration Committee Presence -0.747*** -0.746*** -0.708*** -0.708*** 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
CEO/Chairman Duality -0.054* -0.055* 0.06 0.061 
Firm Risk 0.047** 0.048** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
Performance         
ROA 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
Tobin's Q 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
Ownership         
CEO Ownership -0.003* -0.003* -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Corporate Ownership -0.001* -0.001* 0.001 0.001 
Pension Fund Ownership -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.003* -0.003* -0.005*** -0.005*** 
Institutional Ownership 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Firm Characteristics         
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.071 -0.072 -0.203 -0.207 
Sales Growth 0.074* 0.075* 0.016 0.016 
Leverage 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 
FTSE100 0.970*** 0.969*** 1.133*** 1.134*** 
FTSE250 0.512*** 0.512*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 
FTSE Small Cap 0.083* 0.082* 0.099*** 0.099*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.199 0.199 0.315 0.315 




Table 7 The Effect of Remuneration Consultants on the Gender Pay Gap. 
This table presents the results of a Tobit regression on ln(total compensation) for both executive directors 
(excl. CEOs) and CEOs, conditional on the presence of a top-3 remuneration consultant. Model (1) is the 
standard Tobit; Model (2) also includes interactions between the variable female and the performance 
variables. The significance of the results at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is denoted with *, **, and ***, 
respectively.  
  Executives (excl. CEOs) CEOs
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 4.779*** 4.772*** 2.840*** 2.849*** 
Female Presence         
Female -0.118*** -0.075 -0.278*** -0.426*** 
Female * ROA   -0.002   0.007*** 
Female * Tobin's Q   -0.014   0.029*** 
Female * Top-3 Remun Consultant -0.119** -0.116** 0.516*** 0.539*** 
Positions         
Deputy CEO 0.084*** 0.084*** 
Finance Director -0.092*** -0.091***     
Commercial Director -0.254*** -0.253***     
COO -0.016 -0.016     
Other Executives -0.183 -0.183     
Director Characteristics         
Director/CEO Age -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.002 -0.002 
Director/CEO Tenure 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Governance         
Board Size 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
Female Directors (%) 0.002** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Audit Committee Presence -0.523*** -0.524*** 0.011 0.012 
Nomination Committee Presence 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 
Remuneration Committee Presence 0.673 0.677 1.659 1.657 
Top-3 Remun Consultant Advice 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 
CEO/Chairman Duality -0.011 -0.012 0.029* 0.030* 
Firm Risk 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
Performance         
ROA 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
Tobin's Q -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Ownership         
CEO Ownership -0.001 -0.001 -0.006** -0.006** 
Executive Ownership (excl. CEO) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Non-Executive Ownership -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Corporate Ownership -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
Pension Fund Ownership 0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 
Individual & Families Ownership -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
Firm Characteristics         
Free Cash Flow/Assets -0.257* -0.256* -0.225* -0.227* 
Sales Growth 0.042*** 0.042*** -0.018 -0.018 
Leverage 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
FTSE100 1.022*** 1.021*** 1.187*** 1.188*** 
FTSE250 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.552*** 0.552*** 
FTSE Small Cap 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.186 0.186 0.297 0.297 
Number of Observations 15381 15381 4529 4529
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Table 8 Marital Status and Number of Children. 
Panel A presents the frequency of children for all directors (incl. CEOs) for both the original data set and after applying 
multiple imputation (‘Imputed data’), based on director-year observations. Panel B shows the frequency of family status 
(Single, Married) based on firm-year observations. The Imputed variables are Number (#) of Children and Married. The 




Original data Imputed data 
# of Children 
Male Female Male Female 
0  -   1  9  235 
(0.0%) (0.6%) (0.2%) (17.1%)
1  34   25  718  892 
(4.6%) (15.4%) (15.9%) (65.0%)
2  350   96  2,963  205 
(47.7%) (59.3%) (65.8%) (14.9%)
3  256   37  714  37 
(34.9%) (22.8%) (15.9%) (2.7%)
4  62   3  69  3 
(8.5%) (1.9%) (1.5%) (0.2%)
5  26   -   26  -  
(3.5%) (0.0%) (0.6%) (0.0%)
6  5   -   5  -  
(0.7%) (0.0%) (0.1%) (0.0%)
Total  733   162  4,504  1,372 
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)
Panel B: Marital Status 
  
Original data Imputed data 
Marital status 
Male Female Male Female 
Single 65 90 650 642
(39.2%) (38.8%) (12.2%) (37.9%)
Married 101 142 4,680 1054
(60.8%) (61.2%) (87.8%) (62.1%)
Total 166 232 5,330 1,696
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)
Table 9 Remuneration, Children, and Marital Status. 
Panel A presents the average of the remuneration components (Base Salary, Bonus, Incentive Compensation, Total Compensation) and their frequencies for all 
(male and female) executive directors, depending on parenthood a director has a child or does not have a child. Panel B presents similar data but partitions the 
executive directors based on marital status. Columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) give the average pay component by type of executive director, and columns (5)-(7) 
also report the statistical significance of the difference between columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) respectively (whereby the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are denoted with 
*, **, and ***). The pay gaps (columns (4) and (8)) are the differences in pay between female and male executives (respectively column (2) minus column (3) 
and column (6) minus column (7)). The data are from BoardEx, Manifest, Who’s Who UK, Marquis Who’s Who, and from our own survey, but the data on 
children and marital status are imputed.  
 
Panel A: Average Compensation by Number of Children.       
  Nr. of Children = 0 Pay Gap 1 Nr. of Children > 0 Pay Gap 2 
Compensation Components 

















Base Salary 166.93 197.48 154.99 42.49*** 207.74*** 217.32** 170.28*** 47.04*** 
Bonus 80.73 109.83 69.36 40.47*** 129.37*** 140.65 85.29*** 55.35*** 
Incentive Compensation 194.12 409.07 110.09 298.98*** 334.38*** 373.58 181.16*** 192.42*** 
Total Compensation 473.42 748.31 365.96 382.35*** 715.56*** 774.97 483.33*** 291.64*** 
Frequency in % 5.9% 2.1% 18.0%   94.1% 97.9% 82.0%   
Panel B: Average Compensation by Marital Status.         
  Single Pay Gap 3 Married Pay Gap 4 
Compensation Components 
(in £ 000) Total Male Female (Male-Female) Total Male Female (Male-Female)
Base Salary 188.66 204.95 157.34 47.61*** 211.85*** 220.68***  174.62*** 46.07*** 
Bonus 105.10 123.44 69.84 53.60*** 134.87*** 145.23*** 91.18*** 54.05*** 
Incentive Compensation 306.90 395.31 136.89 258.42*** 333.68 367.69 190.27*** 177.43*** 
Total Compensation 642.92 771.42 395.79 375.64*** 724.16*** 775.34 508.39*** 266.95*** 





Table 10 Treatment Effect Estimation (Female Manager) on Components of Pay for Executive Directors (excl. CEOs). 
This table presents the results of a treatment effect estimation - the treatment is Female - on various pay components (Base Salary, Bonus, Equity-based Compensation, 
Total Compensation) for executive directors excl. CEOs. We compare the pay outcome of directors similar in terms of age, tenure, position, firm size, industry, and 
year in Model (1). In addition, we account for parenthood - the presence of children when the dummy equals 1 ((Model (2)), and for marital status – the dummy is 1 in 
case the director is married (Model (3)). Standard errors are in brackets; 10%, 5%, or 1% are denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. The data are from Manifest, 
Who’s Who UK, Marquis Who’s Who, and from our own survey, but the data on children and marital status are imputed. 
 







Dependent variable: Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Base Salary -21.454*** 0.000 -39.394*** 0.000 -27.902*** 0.000 
  (4.026)   (4.553)   (4.063)   
Bonus -40.394*** 0.009 -36.253*** 0.000 -33.251** 0.017 
  (15.444)   (7.115)   (13.869)   
Equity-based Compensation -98.461*** 0.007 -186.000*** 0.000 -132.070*** 0.001 
  (36.728)   (41.009)   (41.513)   
Total Compensation -161.011*** 0.000 -267.059*** 0.000 -195.182*** 0.000 
  (45.553)   (45.358)   (49.086)   
 
Appendix A:                           Variable Description and Data Source   
 
Panel A: Female Presence  
Female A binary variable capturing the gender of the executive director/CEO. Female is 1; 
male is zero. Source: Boardex, Manifest 
 
Panel B: Positions 
(Deputy) CEO   A dummy variable equal to one if a director holds the position of (Deputy) CEO.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest.     
Executive Chairman  A dummy variable equal to one if a director holds the position of  
Executive Chairman. Source: Boardex, Manifest. 
Finance Director  A dummy variable equal to one if a director holds the position  
of Finance Director. Source: Boardex, Manifest.    
Commercial Director A dummy variable equal to one if a director holds the position  
of Commercial Director. Source: Boardex, Manifest.   
COO  A dummy variable equal to one if a director holds the position of  
Chief Operating Officer. Source: Boardex, Manifest.     
Other Executives   A dummy variable equal to one if the executive director does not hold one of the  
above positions. Source: Boardex, Manifest. 
 
Panel C: Remuneration 
Total Compensation  Sum of all components of remuneration (see below).  
Source: Own calculations based on Boardex, Manifest  
Base Salary   Fixed remuneration.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Bonus    Remuneration based on last-year’s performance; paid out annually.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest  
LT-Pay    Remuneration comprising of stock options and restricted shares (LTIPs).  
 Source: Own calculations, Boardex, Manifest  
ST/LT-Pay   Remuneration calculated as sum of Base Salary and Bonus (short-term pay) divided  
by Long-Term Pay (LT). Source: Boardex, Manifest  
 
Panel D: Director Characteristics 
Director Age (CEO Age)  The age of a director (CEO) (in number of years). Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Director Tenure (CEO Tenure) The number of years a director (CEO) serves in the current position (on the board).  
Source: Boardex, Manifest  
 
Panel E: Governance 
Board Size   The number of directors on the board. Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Non-executive directors (%) The percentage of non-executive directors serving on the board.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Female (%)   Percentage of female directors on the board.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest. 
Audit Comm. Presence  A dummy variable equal to one if an audit committee is present.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Nomination Comm. Presence A dummy variable equal to one if a nomination committee is present.  
 Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Remuneration Comm. Presence A dummy variable equal to one if a remuneration committee is present.  
 Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Firm Risk   The (winsorized) variance of cash flow per shares. Source: Datastream  
Top-3 Remuneration Consultant A dummy variable equal to one if a remuneration consultant (belonging to the top-3  
remuneration consultants based on overall client count of the sample) has advised 
the company. Source: Boardex, Manifest. 
CEO/Chairman Duality  A dummy variable equal to one if the chairman of the board also serves  





Panel F: Performance 
ROA (in %)   Return on Assets. Source: Datastream  
Tobin’s Q   Market capitalization divided by the book value of equity.  
    Source: Datastream  
 
Panel G: Ownership 
CEO Ownership   The percentage of stock held by the CEO.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest  
Executive Ownership (excl. CEOs) The percentage of stock held by the executive directors (excl. CEOs).  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Non-Executive Ownership  The percentage of stock held by the non-executive directors.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Corporate Ownership  The percentage of stock held by corporations.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Institutional Ownership  The percentage of stock held by financial institutions (banks, building societies,  
insurance and assurance financials, unit trusts, investment banks and investment 
trusts, venture capital and private equity firms). Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Pension Fund Ownership  The percentage of stock held by pension funds.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Individuals & Families Ownership The percentage of stock held by individuals and families.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
 
Panel H: Firm Characteristics 
Free Cash Flow / Assets  Free cash flow divided by assets.  
Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Sales Growth   The difference in total sales from the actual and the previous year divided by  
lagged net sales (winsorized). Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Leverage                                           Debt divided by equity (winsorized).  
                                                          Source: Datastream. 
FTSE 100   A dummy variable equal to one if a company is member of the  
FTSE100. Source: Boardex, Manifest  
FTSE 250   A dummy variable equal to one if a company is member of the  
 FTSE250. Source: Boardex, Manifest  
FTSE Small Cap   A dummy variable equal to one if a company is member of the FTSE  
Small Cap. Source: Boardex, Manifest 
Panel I: Private Characteristics 
Number of children  A dummy variable equal to one if a director has one (or more) child(ren).  
Source: Who’s Who UK, Marquis Who’s Who, Own survey. 
Marital Status   Single if individual is not currently married, married otherwise.  
Source: Who’s Who UK, Marquis Who’s Who, Own survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
